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Abstract 
Since bank credit lines are a major source of corporate funding, we examine the 
determinants of credit line usage with a comprehensive database of Spanish corporate 
credit lines. A line’s default status is a key factor driving its usage, which increases as a 
firm’s financial condition worsens. Line usage decreases by roughly 10% for each year of its 
life. Lender characteristics, such as the number and length of a firm’s banking relationships, 
are found to affect a firm’s usage decisions, and credit line usage is found to be inversely 
related to macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Keywords:  credit lines, firm default, bank lending, exposure at default. 
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Introduction 
Bank credit lines are a major source of funding for corporations as well as an important 
business line for commercial banks. Sufi (2008) found that credit lines account for over 80% 
of the bank financing provided to U.S. public firms, while Kashyap et al. (2002) found 
that 70% of bank borrowing by U.S. small firms is through credit lines. For Spanish firms, the 
subject of our study, credit lines account for 32% of banks’ total new lending commitments 
and for 42% of firms’ bank financing, on average. Given this pervasive use of credit lines in 
practice and the importance assigned to them in theory, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), 
our goal is to examine empirically the primary factors influencing firms’ decisions to use their 
credit lines. 
A clearer understanding of corporate credit line usage should provide meaningful 
insights into several inter-related questions regarding corporate finance and credit risk 
management. Sufi (2008) found that credit lines are an important component of firms’ 
liquidity management decisions and that credit line use is determined by an interaction 
between the firm and its lender primarily through covenants based on performance measures, 
such as profitability. Our empirical results based on line-level usage data complement 
this finding, as well as that of Gatev and Strahan (2006) that banks are key liquidity 
providers for firms. [Note that DeAngelo et al. (2002) present a detailed case study of a public 
firm’s credit line terms and usage.] Our results also highlight the importance of firm default risk 
in determining credit line use; in particular, we find that firms heading into default draw on 
their credit lines quite heavily. These results should enhance our understanding of the 
determinants of a lender’s exposure at default (commonly know as EAD) through credit 
lines, which is an important, but scarcely researched, topic in credit risk management 
[see Jiménez et al. (2008), for further discussion]. 
For our analysis, the variable of interest is the percentage of a firm’s committed 
credit line that was actually drawn down in a given year. In fact, to avoid bias due to possible 
reductions in the commitment amount any time during the life of the credit line, the 
denominator of the ratio is kept fixed and equal to the total committed credit at the time when 
the credit line was granted. Our main datasource is the credit register maintained by the 
Banco de España, the Spanish central bank and primary banking supervisory agency. 
Known as the Central de Información de Riesgos (CIR), the dataset contains information 
on loan commitments above €6,000 granted by all banks operating in Spain since 1984. 
The dataset contains information on the amounts drawn and available for all corporate credit 
lines. To our knowledge, this set of corporate credit lines is the most comprehensive 
examined to date and permits analysis at the level of individual credit lines, as opposed to the 
firm-level analysis common in the literature [as per Sufi (2008); and Gatev and Strahan (2006)] 
or the case studies of a particular firm [as in DeAngelo et al. (2002)]. The dataset also contains 
default information specific to individual credit lines and across all of the borrowers’ credit 
commitments. Hence, we have a complete history of firm default behavior. Finally, since 
the sample period spans a complete business cycle, we can analyze the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on credit line utilization. As many of the credit lines represented in 
the CIR database are to smaller Spanish firms, our analysis readily extends to smaller firms 
in other countries, especially Europe and the United States. 
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One of our main findings is that credit line usage is very different for firms that 
eventually default and those that do not, even several years in advance of the default year. 
“Default” is defined in the CIR database to mean that the firm has not met, or is judged by its 
creditors to be unable to meet, its scheduled payments. Credit lines to non-defaulting firms 
in our sample have a median usage ratio of about 43%. Credit lines to firms that eventually 
default have a median ratio of 50% five years prior to default, and that value rises to 71% in 
the default year. We examine this difference further within a reduced form model using 
line-specific, borrower-specific, and lender-specific factors as well as general macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Since the CIR database does not contain firm-level accounting data, we merge our 
credit line dataset with the annual balance sheet reports collected by the Spanish 
government’s Commercial Register and made available electronically since 1992 by 
Informa-SABI, the Spanish subsidiary of Bureau van Dyck. This merged sample of credit lines 
is different from the full sample in that the firms are typically larger and the observed default 
rates are lower. Our empirical results for the merged sample suggest that credit lines to firms 
with higher expected default probabilities over the next calendar year, which we model using 
a standard logistic model of firm default, have higher usage rates. Specifically, an increase of 
one percentage point in expected default probability increases the drawdown rate by 7.4%. 
The quantification of this “default effect” on how firms use their credit lines is a new finding 
in this literature. In addition, the age of the credit line is found to reduce the usage rate. 
This “aging effect” seems to decrease the usage rate by about 10% per year. 
Turning to borrower-specific characteristics, we find that borrowers identified ex-ante 
as riskier due to prior defaults use less of their new credit lines. This result is roughly 
analogous to the finding by Sufi (2008) that banks use financial covenants based on 
profitability to limit credit line use when performance declines. We find that firm size is 
negatively correlated with credit line usage; this result is consistent with our CIR default 
indicator, since smaller and younger firms have higher default rates in the CIR database. Firm 
profitability, as measured by return on assets (ROA), is also negatively correlated with credit 
line usage, a result consistent with Sufi (2008). Moreover, for our study, firm-specific variables 
have a significant economic impact; for example, a one standard deviation increase in ROA 
leads to a decline close to 3% in the usage ratio. The semi-elasticity for the prior default 
indicator is, however, much higher at 12.3%. Overall, these results suggest that Spanish 
banks’ monitoring of firms seems to be based more on default history than on near-term 
financial performance variables. 
Since the CIR database contains detailed information on the bank lenders, we 
examine several questions related to credit supply issues using lender-specific variables. 
We find that a firm’s banking relationships affect their credit line usage in several ways. 
In particular, as the length of a banking relationship increases, usage rates decrease, and that 
firms draw less on credit lines managed by their main banks (i.e., the bank that lends most to 
the firm). Both results are consistent with the argument that banks limit funding to their most 
dependent borrowers. We also find that credit line usage increases with a firm’s number of 
banking relationships, suggesting, as in Degryse and Ongena (2001), Farinha and Santos 
(2002), and Fok, Chang and Lee (2004), that less creditworthy firms and those with bad past 
performance are more likely to establish multiple banking relationships in order to obtain more 
funds when their main banks deny their requests. 
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As noted in both the banking and macroeconomic literatures, the state of the 
business cycle has a definite effect on firm balance sheets, default probabilities and credit 
line usage. In our analysis, we find that Spanish GDP growth is negatively correlated 
with credit line usage; that is, increases in GDP growth are associated with a modest, but 
statistical significant, decline in credit line usage. This result suggests that credit lines 
could be a liquidity insurance mechanism for firms, as discussed by Gatev and Strahan (2006) 
as well as Sufi (2008). However, we do not have information on the interest rates and fees 
charged on these credit lines needed to examine this finding further. 
Even though the CIR database has very limited information on the borrowing 
firms beyond their default histories, it is worth examining the entire dataset of credit lines 
without firm-specific balance-sheet variables. The empirical results for this much larger 
sample, in both the cross-sectional and panel dimension, are similar. Using observed ex-post 
information, such as firm default status and the number of years to default, as an ex-ante 
measure of the risk of the credit line, we find that firms that actually default on their credit 
lines during the sample period have usage rates roughly 40% higher than non-defaulting 
firms, and that these usage rates increase by about 13% per year as the default year 
approaches. In addition, the age of the credit line is again found to decrease the usage 
rate by 10% per year, although this effect is smaller for defaulted firms. The combination of 
these two effects accounts for most of the differences in usage rates by defaulted and 
non-defaulted firms and show the robustness of our previous results. 
In summary, our study uses data on Spanish firms to examine the factors 
driving corporate credit line usage. We find that a wide variety of loan-level, firm-level, and 
lender-level characteristics as well as macroeconomic factors affect these usage rates. 
The most important factors are a firm’s default status (measured either as an ex-ante 
probability or an ex-post realization), the age of the credit line, certain lender characteristics 
(such as the length of the banking relationship), and macroeconomic factors. Our finding 
that drawdowns of credit lines (or EAD) are closely related to line-level default probabilities has 
important implications for credit risk management and modeling techniques. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a short literature review, 
highlighting empirical studies that informed our choice of explanatory variables. Section 2 
describes the CIR database and our sample of credit line usage observations. We present 
some descriptive statistics and analysis that highlight the importance of firm default on these 
usage rates. We also discuss the properties of the smaller sample based on merging the CIR 
database with the Informa-SABI database of borrowers’ balance sheet variables. Section 3 
presents our regression models and empirical results, and section 4 concludes. 
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1 Literature review 
The extant academic literature related to corporate credit lines examines a variety of issues, 
ranging from credit line origination, which measures loan supply, to utilization, 
which measures loan demand.1 Melnik and Plaut (1986) found for a surveyed group 
of U.S. corporations that credit line commitment size was an increasing function of maturity, 
fees, collateral, firm size, firm liquidity and risk premium. Ham and Melnik (1987) found for a 
sample of 90 U.S. nonfinancial firms that credit line size was related positively to total sales, 
borrowed reserves and collateral, while related negatively to interest rate costs. Berger and 
Udell (1995) found for a sample of small U.S. firms that credit line terms, such as interest 
rates and collateral requirements, are negatively related with the length of the banking 
relationship. Shockley and Thakor (1997) examined credit line pricing using data for one large 
bank. Dennis et al. (2000) examined jointly several credit line terms, such as maturity, interest 
rate spread, fees and collateralization, at origination and found an important degree of 
interdependence between these variables. In a case study, DeAngelo et al. (2002) examined 
the credit line terms and usage of a single public company in light of its overall corporate 
strategy and eventual default, finding that the bank reduced the committed amount in 
the credit line as the quality of the firm declined. 
A few papers have used corporate credit lines to analyze the role of banks within 
the financial system. Morgan (1998) uses credit line data from bank surveys collected 
from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to examine the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the U.S. He shows that loans based on existing credit lines accelerate 
or remain unchanged after a policy tightening, but that origination of new term loans slows. 
This distinction reflects a decrease in loan supply and not loan demand. Saidenberg and 
Strahan (1999) find that firms drew upon their bank lines when access to the commercial 
paper market was limited in 1998. Gatev and Strahan (2006) further examine banks’ role 
in providing liquidity to the financial system using data on credit lines established to support 
commercial paper issuance. They find that banks are able to supply credit via these lines 
when liquidity is low because banks are the natural recipients of funds when this occurs. 
Our paper focuses directly on the determinants of corporate credit line use, as in 
Sufi (2008) and Agarwal et al. (2004). Sufi (2008) takes a corporate finance angle looking 
at the role of credit lines as an alternative liquidity management tool. Using a sample of 
public U.S. firms from 1996 to 2003, he finds that credit line access and use was influenced 
by firm profitability, industry, age and size. He finds the supply of credit lines to be particularly 
sensitive to firm profitability; a one standard deviation move in EBITDA raises line 
commitments by 20% to 25%. He finds that technical defaults (i.e., the violation of 
line covenants) the year before lead to increased restrictions on the undrawn portions 
of credit lines, although the reduction seems to be temporary. The amount available from the 
credit line appears to return to its prior level two years after the violation. Agarwal et al. (2004) 
examine a proprietary dataset of loan commitments extended by a single bank to 712 
privately-held U.S. firms. They find that firms with higher growth commit to larger lines of 
credit and have a higher rate of line utilization. Furthermore, firms facing higher rates and fees 
as well as firms facing more uncertainty in their funding needs commit to smaller credit lines. 
                                                                          
1. There is a reasonably large literature on consumer credit lines, such as credit card financing [see Gross and 
Souleles (2002); Calem et al. (2006), and the references therein). Agarwal et al. (2006) examined home equity 
lines of credit. 
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 As mentioned, the Spanish CIR database allows us to examine a larger set of credit 
lines across a wide cross-section of firms and a longer time period than these prior studies. 
Spanish firms, especially smaller ones, use credit lines primarily for working capital purposes.2 
In addition, the structure of the CIR data allows us to examine a wider variety of line-specific, 
firm-specific and borrower-specific factors, as well as general macroeconomic factors, 
influencing corporate credit line usage. As in Sufi (2008), we examine how defaulting on a 
credit line (or any related credit) affects credit line usage. In addition, we examine several 
other line-specific variables, such as the line’s lifespan (i.e., the number of years active) as well 
as the use of collateral.3 
Regarding firm-specific variables, the CIR database only permits a limited study due 
to a dearth of accounting variables; in contrast, banking relationship variables, such as 
prior default status and the nature of firms’ banking relationships, as per Petersen and 
Rajan (1994), are available. However, we merge the CIR database with the Informa-SABI 
database of Spanish firms, which includes a much richer set of accounting variables. This 
combined dataset is smaller, but it allows the analysis of such key variables as borrower size, 
age, leverage and profitability. 
For lender-specific variables, the CIR database allows us to examine several 
features. For example, Coleman et al. (2002) found that lender characteristics impact loan 
contract terms. Specifically, they found that riskier banks and banks with greater bargaining 
power lend for longer maturities and charge higher spreads; see also Hao (2004). For our 
study, we examine the impact that measures of bank risk and main bank status have on 
corporate credit line use. In addition, Salas and Saurina (2002) found that the type of lending 
institution has an important effect on corporate lending within the Spanish banking system. 
                                                                          
2. Prior studies of credit lines related to public U.S. firms have examined their use as back up financing for 
commercial paper. However, for most Spanish firms, commercial paper is not an important financing tool. In 2007, 
outstanding short-term commercial paper by Spanish non-financial firms was €4 billion (or about 1%) relative to total 
bank lending to non-financial firms of €443 billion. 
3. See Boot and Thakor (1994) for a theoretical discussion of collateral and Jiménez et al. (2006) for empirical evidence 
from the Spanish banking industry. 
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2 Database and descriptive statistics 
2.1 The CIR database 
Our datasource is the credit register maintained by the Banco de España, the Spanish central 
bank and primary banking supervisory agency. Known as the Central de Información de 
Riesgos (CIR), the dataset contains information on any loan commitment above €6,000 
granted by any bank operating in Spain. The database is essentially a census of all corporate 
bank lending within Spain from 1984 to 2005, a period that includes the deep recession 
of 1992 to 1994 and two expansionary periods from the late 1980s through early 1990s and 
from 1997 onwards. The database is updated at a monthly frequency, but our analysis is 
conducted at an annual frequency using data as of the last month of each sample year. 
The CIR database contains detailed information about loan characteristics such 
as instrument type (i.e., commercial loan, lease financing, etc.), currency, maturity, 
collateralization, default status as well as the amount drawn and the total commitment 
available for credit lines.4 The definition of default within the CIR database is that the borrower 
has loan payments overdue by more than 90 days, which is the legal definition of default in 
Spain, or it has been classified as a doubtful borrower by the bank (i.e., the lender itself 
believes there is a high probability of non-payment). Here we differ from Sufi (2008) for whom 
default means a breach of the existing covenants on the credit line. In addition, information on 
the borrower’s industry and province of headquarters are available. We can also obtain 
information on the bank-borrower relationship via simple data transformations; for example, 
the length of a banking relationship, the number of loans outstanding, and the percentage of 
a firm’s credit line commitments provided by a specific bank. 
To construct our dataset, we first identify new bank credit lines to non-financial 
firms in the CIR database. Despite the fact that most credit lines have a maturity of a year or 
less, it is quite common to find them again the following year with exactly the same 
characteristics (in particular, the commitment size), changing only the amount drawn. 
For those cases, following Moral (2006), we assume it is the same credit line, although we 
classify the observations as having a short maturity. Then, we track those lines through 
time using all their available characteristics (i.e., borrower, collateral, etc.). 
If we find that the commitment amount for a firm’s credit line has increased, we treat 
this as a new credit line in our dataset. However, if the commitment amount declines, we 
assume that it is the same credit line and keep the commitment amount at the original value. 
The rationale behind this choice is that an increase in commitment amount reflects a renewed 
lending relationship, whereas a reduction is simply a risk management technique available to 
the bank under the existing relationship. Empirical support for this filtering choice is provided 
by Sufi (2008), who found that credit line commitments were reduced immediately after a 
technical default only to be returned to their previous levels the year after. 
After applying our filtering procedures, we have a sample of 2,078,434 credit 
line-year observations corresponding to 770,371 credit lines granted to 368,977 firms by 407 
banks over a twenty year period. This dataset is a clear improvement over previous 
studies since it is not limited to a single bank, a specific set of firms, or a narrow time period. 
                                                                          
4. Note that the CIR dataset does not contain information on credit line pricing, such as fees and interest rates. 
For a more detailed explanation of the CIR dataset, see Jiménez and Saurina (2004). 
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Roughly 55% of the observations correspond to credit lines held by a firm with a single 
bank, 20% correspond to firms that hold two banking relationships, 10% with three banks, 
and the remaining 15% with more than three. In terms of defaults, 1.80% of the firms in our 
sample default on 0.59% of their credit lines, which make up 0.22% of our credit-line year 
observations. 
For our analysis, we compute the credit line usage rate as the ratio between the 
drawn amount at each time and the total commitment size of the line at the time it was 
granted. In terms of notation, the usage rate of credit line i by firm j as issued by bank k in 
year t is calculated as 
,
τijk
ijkt
ijkt COMMIT
DRAWN
RDRAWN =  (1) 
where DRAWNijkt is the amount drawn on the credit line at the end of year t and COMMITijkτ 
is the original commitment provided in year τ (i.e., the year of the line’s origination). Note that 
since we lock the commitment amount at the origination value, changes in RDRAWNijkt are 
due only to changes in the drawn amount of the credit line.5 The histogram of RDRAWNijkt for 
the whole sample is presented in Figure 1. Just over 15% of all credit line-year observations 
are zero, corresponding to 306,274 unique credit lines. Conversely, almost 6% of these 
observations are at 100% usage. For the remaining 79% of the observations, the distribution 
is relatively symmetrical around the 50% value. 
2.2 Univariate event study 
Figure 2 presents one of our most important empirical results. Since the CIR database 
has information on when firms default on their credit lines, we can transform our credit line 
usage data from calendar time to event time, where the default year is designated as 
time zero. For each of the 17 years for which we have event-time data (i.e., 22 sample 
years, -5 years of prior event time), RDRAWNijkt for defaulted credit lines are placed into event 
time with that year as time zero. These ratios are then tracked for five years prior to (i.e., back 
to event time -5). The figure presents the median values of the usage rates for defaulted credit 
lines. We also plot the median value for non-defaulting firms, which is 47%, for reference. 
Table 1 presents the underlying numbers. 
Firms that default on a credit line draw down more than firms that do not default up 
to three years before the default year. At that point, the median usage rate for defaulting 
firms is at 58%. By the default year, the median RDRAWNijkt ratio for defaulting firms reaches 
its maximum of about 70%. This univariate analysis shows that the default status of a firm on 
a credit line is a major driver of its credit line usage. Our subsequent regression analysis, 
presented in section 3, confirms that this factor remains the most important one, even after 
controlling for line-specific, firm-specific and lender-specific factors as well as for general 
macroeconomic conditions. This empirical result also highlights the importance of modeling 
                                                                          
5. For this dataset, 29% of the credit lines experience decreases in their commitment amounts, although we keep 
them fixed at their original values. The decision to fix the commitment amount at the origination value should 
create a downward bias for the RDRAWN values for credit lines whose commitment amount declines during the life 
of the line. That is, since the denominator is not declining in our measure, the RDRAWN value is not rising as it 
should, assuming that the drawn amount remains the same or declines more slowly than the commitment amount. 
Therefore, our definition of the usage rate could bias the results against us by making it more difficult to find a 
relationship between credit line use and measures of credit standing and/or firm performance. Given our strong results 
presented in section 3, we believe that this bias does not impact our inference and, on the contrary, reinforces our 
findings. 
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credit line usage within a risk management context and, in particular, the need to pay 
attention to the interaction between PD and EAD [see Jiménez et al. (2008), for a detailed 
analysis of EAD measures using the CIR database]. 
2.3 Subsample based on merging with firm balance sheet data 
In line with the existing literature, we extend our analysis by incorporating firm-level 
accounting data. However, since the CIR database does not contain such data, we merge 
our credit line dataset with the annual balance sheet reports collected by the Spanish 
government’s Commercial Register and made available electronically since 1992 by 
Informa-SABI, the Spanish subsidiary of Bureau van Dyck. The Informa-SABI dataset contains 
the financial statements that the banks had at the time the credit lines were granted and allow 
us to use a richer set of firm-specific variables in our analysis. 
After merging the datasets, the Informa-SABI subsample contains 425,939 credit line 
observations corresponding to 183,723 credit lines for 85,949 firms granted by 301 banks. 
The merged sample of credit lines is different from the full sample in two important ways. 
First, the subsample period is shorter, spanning from 1992 to 2005 with less coverage in 
the first two years. Since coverage in these early years corresponds to a recession in the 
Spanish economy, useful observations regarding defaulted credit lines are not available 
for this subsample. The percentage of defaulted observations is 0.12%, which is lower 
than the 0.57% percentage observed in the whole sample for the same time period, again 
partly due to the loss of observations in the early 1990s. This fact suggests a bias within this 
sub-sample towards higher-quality firms, which must be taken into account when analyzing 
the results. However, the histogram and event study corresponding to the Informa-SABI 
subsample are similar to those of the full sample. Second, and very related to the previous 
issue the size distribution of the firms within this sample is larger; that is, typically larger firms 
are recorded in the Informa-SABI database relative to all CIR firms. For example, the median 
value of the loan commitment for the subsample is €1.3 million, relative to just €408,000 for 
the full sample. This size bias also contributes to the lower default rates in this subsample. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0821 
3 Econometric modeling 
3.1 Baseline model 
The baseline model we propose for analyzing the determinants of credit line usage employs 
the Informa-SABI sample and takes the following form: 
ijkt 0 1 it 2 jt 3 kt 4 t ijk itRDRAWN credit line firm bank cycle= β +β +β +β +β + η + ε , (2) 
where credit lineit is a vector of credit line characteristics; firmjt is a vector of firm-specific 
characteristics; bankkt is a vector of variables that control for bank characteristics; cyclet is a 
measure of expected macroeconomic conditions at time t+1; ηijk is an unobservable credit 
line effect that is fixed over time and thus also encompasses unobservable firm and bank 
effects; and εit is an error term. Note that we cluster the standard errors in our calculations on 
the basis of the firms in the sample, to control for possible within-firm correlation. 
 We structure the credit lineit vector of explanatory variables to reflect relevant 
features of the credit lines and their potential default status. Specifically, 
1 11it it
12 it
13 14i i
credit line  PD
line age
long term collateralized .
β = β
+ β
+ β + β
 (3) 
With this specification, we highlight the impact of the credit line’s potential default 
status over year t by generating a model-based default probability, denoted as PDit. As a 
firm’s financial condition deteriorates and its default probability increases, we expect credit 
line usage to increase and β11 > 0. To generate PDit, we first use a standard probit model that 
includes much of the information available in year t-1 to the bank regarding the firm’s financial 
condition; that is, as in the full model, we include credit line, firm and bank characteristics as 
well as macroeconomic indicators.6 The estimated PDit is then included as a covariate in the 
second stage of the estimation, where the standard errors are appropriately adjusted 
following Murphy and Toppel (1985). The introduction of this variable into the model can be 
viewed as a form of instrumental variables regression that should mitigate some of the 
possible endogeniety concerns, especially with respect to firm characteristics. 
To model the “age effect” of the credit line, we examine how credit line utilization 
evolves over the life of the contract using the line ageit variable, which is simply a linear trend. 
The effect of line ageit on the usage rate is unknown. A positive coefficient would indicate that 
firms increase line use as the credit line ages. However, a negative value would suggest 
that credit lines are used most intensively in the first year and decline afterwards. We also 
introduce two time-invariant, credit line characteristics. The long termi variable is equal 
to one if the reported maturity of the credit line is greater than one year. While these cases 
account for only 22% of the observations, longer maturities could be indicative of differences 
in drawdown patterns. The collateralizedi variable is equal to one if the credit line is 
                                                                          
6. The specification of our reduced-form default probability model is: 
PDit = F(c0 + c11 long termi + c12 collateralizedi + c2 firmjt-1 + c3 firm2jt-1 + c4 firm3jt-1 + c5 bankkt-1+c6 cyclet-1), 
where the firm, bank and cycle vectors of variables are those defined in the upcoming text plus the liquidity ratio 
of the firm at time t-1; and F(x) is the normal probability distribution function. We use squared and cubic 
terms to maximize the explanatory power of the PD model. The empirical results are available upon request. 
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collateralized, which was found to be significant in Jiménez and Saurina (2004) as well 
as Jiménez et al. (2006). Only 8% of the observations correspond to collateralized lines. 
In addition to these line-specific variables, the health and performance of the overall 
firm should also impact its credit lines’ usage rates.7 Turning to the firm-specific variables 
available from the Informa-SABI database, our baseline model specifies the firm-specific 
variable as: 
2 jt 21 jt-1
22 jt-1
23 jt-1
24 jt-1
25 jt-1
26 jt-1
27 jt-1
28 Sector,i
firm   ln(total assets )
ln(1+age of the firm )
ROA
equity/total assets
firm risk
ln(1 # years with the bank )
ln(# bank relationships )
I
β = β
+β
+β
+β
+β
+β +
+β
+β +β29 Region,iI .
 (4) 
Note that these variables are lagged to better capture the firms’ decision process 
regarding its credit line usage and to avoid possible endogeneity problems, following 
Sufi (2008) and Jiménez et al. (2006).8 The ln(total assetsjt-1) variable is the logged book value 
of the firm. Firm age is also introduced in log form. Firm profitability is measured by 
book-value return on assets, denoted as ROAjt-1, which is the ratio of earnings (before taxes) 
to total assets. As a proxy for firm solvency, we use the equity/total assetsjt-1 variable. Since 
larger, older, more profitable and well-capitalized firms are likely to have higher credit quality, 
we expect a negative relationship between all these variables and credit line usage. 
A firm’s prior borrowing history should be a key component of its overall funding 
decisions and its credit line use. Based on the CIR database, we construct the firm riskjt-1 
variable as a proxy for that history. It is a binary variable equal to one if the firm had defaulted 
on any other loan prior to time t. Note that just 1.5% of the observations correspond to such 
firms. Since this firm riskjt-1 proxy is available to all lenders, we should expect closer 
                                                                          
7. It is challenging to control for firm-level usage rates given the individual credit line-level approach followed in the 
paper. In particular, a firm’s overall degree of liquidity (i.e., its access to both cash and loan commitments) should 
influence a firm’s decision on its credit line usage rates. However, we did not include this variable directly in our 
analysis due to the potential degree of endogenity between these variables, but it is included indirectly via the PDit 
variable. As a robustness check (available upon request), we estimated the model including a measure of firm 
liquidity (cash holdings to total assets), and the inclusion of the variable did not change the estimation results materially. 
Furthermore, we estimated the model just for firms with a single credit line, whose observations account for about 
half of the dataset (available upon request). For this regression, we created an alternative usage rate defined as the 
ratio of the line’s drawn amount to the sum of the line’s commitment amount and the firm’s cash holdings at the line’s 
origination. The estimation results are qualitatively very similar to the full sample results discussed in section IV.C. These 
robustness results suggest that our indirect inclusion of firm-level liquidity is sufficient to address this endogenity 
concern. 
8. To test whether these variables are redundant in light of their inclusion of the generated PDit variable, we ran the 
regression without the PDit variable and found no real change in the firm variables’ coefficients. These results 
are available upon request. 
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monitoring of firms with prior defaults, which could result in their having lower credit line 
usage rates (i.e., β25>0).9 
The next two firm-specific variables are related to the nature of corporate 
banking relationships, which are proxies for the firm’s bargaining power and solvency. 
The ln(1+#years with the bankjt-1) variable measures the length of the relationship with the 
bank granting the credit line, which we use to examine the possibility of the so-called 
“hold-up” problem faced by borrowers; see Boot (2000) for a review of the relationship 
banking literature. In contrast, the ln(#bank relationshipsjt-1) variable could act in the opposite 
direction since multiple bank relationships may suggest greater bargaining power by the 
borrower and hence probably less information exchange with individual lenders (β27>0). On 
the other hand, several studies have shown that badly performing firms may also initiate more 
bank relationships [see, for instance, Degryse and Ongena (2001); Farinha and Santos (2002); 
and Fok, Chang and Lee (2004)], which would imply a higher usage rates for firms with a 
larger number of bank relationships (i.e., β27>0). Finally, we also include indicator variables for 
the firm’s industry and region of origin. 
In line with other studies showing that bank characteristics impact loan access 
and pricing, we examine whether such variables affect credit line usage. Thus, the third term 
of our baseline model is constructed as: 
3 kt 31 ijk 32 kt 33 kt
34 k 35 k
bank     main bank  bank share  bank NPL ratio
savings  bank credit cooperative .
β = β +β +β
+β +β  (5) 
The main bankijk variable equals one if the credit line is handled by the firm’s largest 
lender; just over 39% of the observations fall into this category. Sharpe (1990) argues that the 
monitoring process provides the main lending bank with a near monopoly on information 
regarding borrower credit quality, which could lead to a “hold-up” situation. In this case, the 
main bank could constrain the liquidity of the firm, suggesting the β31 coefficient should be 
negative. As mentioned before, as an alternative to the “hold-up” hypothesis, prior research 
has shown that firms with past poor performance and firms that more often had past due 
loan payments are more likely to initiate multiple relationships because of the main bank’s 
unwillingness to provide additional funds. This outcome would imply a positive coefficient on 
the number of banking relationships and a negative one on the main bank variable (i.e., β31<0) 
if less creditworthy firms decide to enter into new relationships keeping their main bank 
unchanged. 
The bank sharekt variable is constructed using the CIR dataset as a bank’s share of 
the corporate loan market and is a proxy for bank size. The bank NPL ratiokt variable, 
constructed as the ratio of a bank’s nonperforming loans within the CIR database to its total 
loans minus the average bank NPL in that year, is a proxy for bank riskiness. The signs on the 
coefficients for these two variables are unclear a priori, and we view them more as control 
variables. We also include as control variables the type of the bank, which was shown by 
Salas and Saurina (2002) to be important within the Spanish economy. Our sample consists 
                                                                          
9. Note that our firm riskjt-1 variable is similar in spirit to the modeling strategy used by Sufi (2008) regarding his technical 
default indicator. The difference is that he includes his indicator variable in a regression with other measures of firm risk. 
In fact, his Table 8 shows that credit line availability depends crucially on that variable and not on other firm specific 
variables. Hence, a default indicator might possibly be a sufficient statistic for other financial characteristics of a firm. 
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of corporate credit lines originated by commercial banks, savings banks and credit 
cooperatives, which account for 95% of bank lending in the economy. 
Finally, general macroeconomic conditions should play an important role in credit line 
usage from a theoretical point of view. The literature on the lending channel of monetary 
policy transmission has established that firms are more constrained in their access to external 
financing during recessions and hence more likely to draw on their credit lines; see 
Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) for analysis of a recent such episode. This outcome would 
imply that firms will use their existing credit lines more in anticipation of economic downturns. 
As we do not have firm-level data on sales and orders, we use the realized value of real, 
annual Spanish GDP growth from period t+1 as our proxy measure of expected conditions. 
Our specification is: 
4 t 41 t 1cycle GDPG .+β = β  (6) 
We would expect negative GDP growth rate to cause an increase in credit line usage 
and thus β41 to be negative. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory 
variables in the Informa-SABI subsample. The distribution of the utilization ratio RDRAWNijkt 
is rather symmetric with mean and median values of 45% and 44%, respectively. 
As mentioned, the proportion of observations corresponding to defaulted credit lines is 
only 0.12%. The year-to-default variable ranges from -6 to 0, but has average and median 
values of -1. The average line age for our sample is 1.4 years. With respect to firm 
characteristics, the firms are relatively large with a mean of €2.7 million in total assets 
and a median value of €1.3 million. The firms are profitable with an average ROA 
of 7.2% and well-capitalized with an average equity-to-assets ratio of 27%. The prior 
default indicator affects 1.5% of the observations, which is in line with the 2% of the full 
CIR sample. The average length of the bank relationship is 5 years, while firms have, 
on average, 3.5 lenders.10 Note that these values are larger than those observed for the 
full CIR sample (see section 3.4). 
Regarding bank level variables, 39% of the credit line usage observations are linked 
to banks that are the largest (or main) lender to the firm. The average loan market share of 
each bank is relatively low at 0.04%, although the maximum is 14.7%. The deviation of the 
non-performing loan ratio with respect to the yearly average has a zero mean, with 
considerable dispersion. As determined by Salas and Saurina (2002), it is important to 
mention of the types of Spanish banks. Both commercial and savings banks play a significant 
role in credit and deposit markets, holding similar shares of each market. Yet, their 
organizational structures are quite different. Commercial banks are for-profit firms under 
shareholder control, while savings banks (or cajas de ahorros) are effectively commercial 
entities operated by not-for-profit organizations controlled by depositors, employees and 
other public and private groups. These two bank types exhibit important differences in 
non-performing loan ratios, a result that might be relevant for their extension of credit lines. 
For our sample, commercial and savings banks have a 43% and 52% share, respectively, 
of the credit line-year observations, while credit cooperatives make up the remaining 5% of 
the observations. At the beginning of the overall sample period in 1986, commercial banks 
                                                                          
10. Note that these latter two variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles and at the 99% percentile, 
respectively, to reduce estimation bias due to outliers. 
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dominated the market with a market share of 80%. The progressive entrance of savings 
banks into corporate lending, mainly after the regulatory changes introduced in the late 
1980s, caused a steady decline in the market share of commercial banks in favor of savings 
banks.11 
3.2 Model estimation 
We estimate our baseline model using three econometric techniques. First, we use OLS 
regression with random effects, which assumes strict exogeneity between the unobserved 
credit line effects (i.e., ijkη ) and the explanatory variables. Note that the common effects 
also control for firm and bank effects, but we cannot separate them out. The second 
estimation technique we use is a Tobit model with a double censure, since the RDRAWNijkt 
variable is bounded by the unit interval. We motivate our use of the Tobit model by thinking of 
y* as a firm’s desired level of credit line utilization as opposed to the observed value y. In such 
cases, OLS techniques could generate downward biased coefficients. By taking account 
of the censoring, the Tobit model should avoid these biases. 
Our third estimation technique is the Within-Groups estimation that treats ijkη  as a 
fixed effect. This estimation technique controls for possible correlation of the unobserved fixed 
effects with the regressors; that is, it helps account for the possibility that banks may have 
more information about the risk profile of the firm than is captured and observable in 
our datasets. This technique is our preferred approach, and we highlight these results in the 
presentation of the empirical results. Note that the use of fixed effects in this estimation 
technique could diminish the effect of firm- and bank-specific variables and lead to smaller 
coefficient values. 
Finally, it is worth noting that given the large number of observations, denoted as N, 
in our Informa-SABI subsample as well as the full CIR sample, the estimated standard 
errors will be very low since they are proportional to 1/N. Thus, almost all our explanatory 
variables will be statistically significant, despite their relatively small marginal effects on the 
dependent variable. For this reason, we show both the p-values of the coefficients and 
the semi-elasticities of the variables. The semi-elasticities measure the percentage change 
in the dependent variable to unit increases in the explanatory variables expressed in levels 
or 100% increases in the explanatory variables expressed in logged form, while the other 
explanatory variables are kept at their means. 
3.3 Empirical results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the baseline model as applied to the Informa-SABI 
subsample. Columns 1 and 2 contains the estimated results of the OLS and Tobit model, 
respectively, while the third column presents the Within-Groups results. The last column 
presents a robustness analysis. 
Comparing the first two columns of Table 3, we observe two important results. 
First, for the majority of the variables of interest, both estimation techniques report similar 
results regarding the sign of the estimated coefficients. Second, the coefficients are smaller, in 
absolute terms, for the OLS specification than for the Tobit one, pointing out that the linear 
model exhibits some downward bias, as we previously discussed. Note that test statistics 
indicate significant first- and second-order autocorrelation in the residuals of the OLS and 
Tobit estimations, consistent with the presence of credit line fixed effects that could bias 
                                                                          
11. The banking liberalization process in Spain and its impact is discussed by Salas and Saurina (2003). 
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the estimated coefficients, in spite of the inclusion of industry and regional dummies in the 
estimated model. Furthermore, the autocorrelation coefficients for the residuals show a 
slow decline from the first-order autocorrelation to the fifth. This pattern also supports 
the existence of persistent differences among credit lines that remain in the data over at least 
a five-year period. 
Focusing on the third column, which address these empirical concerns considering 
the unobserved credit line effects as fixed, the coefficient on the PDit variable is positive 
and significant with a semi-elasticity of 7.4%, which implies that a one percentage point 
increase in a firm’s expected default probability causes its credit usage rate to increase 
by 7.4%. As the mean value of RDRAWN is 45%, an increase of one percentage point on PD 
would increase the usage rate to 48.2%. 
We find that the line age variable also has an important effect on credit line usage. 
This effect, captured as a linear trend, has a negative and significant coefficient; the 
semi-elasticity implies that the usage rate decreases about 10% per year (in both OLS and 
Within-Groups estimations, slightly higher for the Tobit model) with respect to the average 
usage rate. 
While these two effects are key drivers of credit line usage, we are also interested 
in the impact that our maturity and collateral indicators have. To examine these effects, 
we must use the OLS and Tobit results that retain indicator variables in the regression. 
The maturity indicator has a positive relationship, suggesting that longer maturity lines have a 
usage rate that is roughly 6% higher than one-year lines. This result could indicate that firms 
treat longer-term credit lines as a more stable funding source and use them more. 
Interestingly, the coefficients on collateral are different for the OLS and Tobit estimations, 
most probably due to the downward bias in the OLS results due to treating RDRAWN 
as unbounded. Thus, collateralized credit lines appear to have slightly higher usage rates 
than uncollateralized lines, with a corresponding semi-elasticity of 4.6%. Since collateral is an 
ex-ante proxy of credit risk, as found by Jiménez and Saurina (2004), the positive coefficient 
is in line with the assumption that less creditworthy firms are more likely to drawdown their 
credit lines. 
With regard to the firm-specific variables, column 3 shows that increased firm risk 
leads to increased credit line usage. Specifically, the Within-Groups coefficients on the firm 
size and ROA variables are negative and significant, while age of the firm and equity over 
total assets are also negative although not significant. This empirical evidence is in line 
with the results obtained by Sufi (2008), who found that profitability is an important 
element in a bank’s decision to grant a corporate credit line. Our results are also in line 
with the assumption that less creditworthy firms (i.e., smaller and less profitable firms) use 
their credit lines more intensively than higher-quality ones. In contrast, the firm risk indicator 
variable has a semi-elasticity of -12.3%, suggesting that firms with a prior default have 
usage rates of 39.4%, relative to the sample average of 45%. Overall, these firm-level results 
suggest that Spanish banks’ monitoring of firms seems to be based more on default history 
than on near-term financial performance variables. 
The length of the banking relationship is also negatively related with usage, 
suggesting both that older customers do not draw down their credit lines as much and that a 
potential hold-up problem may exist. The higher usage rates found for banks with multiple 
bank relationships is also consistent with borrowers facing a potential hold-up problem. 
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Alternatively, it might be possible that credit lines are an expensive and flexible source of 
funds. That might explain why firms as they grow in assets, age or confidence (i.e. longer 
relationships) tend to draw less from them and, arguably, use more of other banking 
instruments. Moreover, as a bank relationship lengthens, the firm should be able to obtain 
additional benefits, such as longer loan maturities, looser collateral requirements or 
easier availability of funds in case of a common (or non-idiosyncratic) negative shock. 
With respect to the lender characteristics, the main bank variable has a 
semi-elasticity of -5.9%, which lowers the usage rate to 42% relative to the average value 
of 45%. This result suggests that banks use their relative advantage in banking relationships 
to limit firm borrowing. Bank size, proxied for as the total share of lending within the CIR 
database, is not statistically significant, but credit lines granted by higher-risk banks 
(i.e., higher NPL with respect to the yearly average) are drawn slightly more than average. 
This result seems to suggest a possible supply effect where riskier banks allow more line 
usage (by riskier borrowers). Regarding differences across bank types, we need to examine 
the Tobit parameter estimates and find that credit lines granted by savings banks and 
cooperatives have lower usage rates than commercial banks. The result may be due to these 
banks’ entry to the corporate banking sector via lending to higher-quality firms, or perhaps to 
their more conservative policies than commercial banks, as per Salas and Saurina (2002). 
Finally, our results indicate a significant negative relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions and credit line use. The Within-Groups estimate of 
the macroeconomic coefficient is negative with a semi-elasticity of -0.9%. As suggested 
in the theoretical literature, such as Thakor (2005), firms use their credit lines to 
secure liquidity during worsening economic conditions, but instead rely more on their 
own cash flows or other cheaper sources of liquidity during periods of improved conditions. 
Unfortunately, we do not have further information, such as the interest rates paid on 
these credit lines, to examine whether credit lines are used as a liquidity insurance 
mechanism with a corresponding premium over other funding sources. 
The last column of Table 3 presents a robustness test of our results to an 
alternative definition of the dependent variable. As discussed in section 2.1, our RDRAWNijkt 
measure is defined so as to vary only due to changes in the numerator’s drawn amount over 
the life of the credit line, even though we do observe variation in the denominator’s 
commitment amount. Since 71% of the 183,723 credit lines (or 130,141 credit lines and 
264,272 observations) do not experience a change in their commitment amount over the life 
of the line, we present the Within-Groups regression results for this subsample to see if our 
definition introduces any bias. The subsample results are consistent with those for the entire 
sample in presented in column 3. The only exceptions are the lack of significance for the firm 
risk and relationship length variables. This last result lowers the concern about the potential 
hold-up problem. Thus, we conclude that our definition of RDRAWN is not hindering our 
qualitative results and inference. 
In summary, we find that corporate credit line usage is affected by a wide variety of 
factors. Our results suggest that firm performance (especially as summarized by our default 
probability variable), line age, prior default history, profitability ratios, credit supply 
(i.e., bank-firm relationships) and the cyclical position of the economy variables are the most 
important. 
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3.4 Analysis of the full CIR sample 
As mentioned before, the CIR database does not contain detailed firm-level information. 
However, it does contain many more defaulted credit line observations; 0.57% relative to 
0.12%. In this section, we use the information available to examine the robustness of 
our subsample results within the full CIR sample. Table 4 presents the summary statistics 
for the regression variables. The main differences between the firms in the samples are that 
they draw more on their credit lines; have a higher default rate; have a worse default history; 
and are more bank-reliant (i.e., higher percentage with a main bank and fewer banking 
relationships). 
We again use the baseline model described before, but we redefine the credit line- 
and firm-specific vectors of variables. The credit line-specific vector is 
2
1 it 11 12 it 13 it i
14 15 i it
16 i 16 i
credit line     ( # years from default # years from default ) Defaulted
( Defaulted ) line age
long term collateralized .
β = β +β +β ⋅
+ β +β ⋅
+β +β
 (7) 
With this specification, we highlight the impact of the credit line’s ex-post default 
status over the sample period and its age effects. The “default effect” captured in the first 
term measures both the impact of credit line default through the Defaulted indicator variable, 
which equals one for credit lines that are defaulted on during our sample period, and through 
its prior-to-default effect. We set this latter variable equal to the actual number of years prior 
to default for defaulting credit lines, such that it is an ordinal variable less or equal than 
zero (i.e., it takes the values -11, -10, …, 0). We also introduce a quadratic effect to allow for 
a greater flexibility of response. From the descriptive analysis presented earlier, we expect a 
positive sign for both the β12 and β13 coefficients since usage rates rise as the default 
year approaches. Moreover, if credit lines to riskier borrowers have higher usage rates, 
we expect a positive β11 coefficient, which would capture the difference in levels of usage 
rates between defaulted and non-defaulted credit lines. 
 As before, we model the “age effect” of the credit line with the line ageit variable, 
which is simply a linear trend. Now, we also permit a different slope for defaulted credit lines 
by using an interaction term with the Defaultedi indicator. The effect of Line ageit on the usage 
rate is unknown. A positive coefficient would indicate that firms increase line use as the credit 
line ages. However, a negative value would suggest that credit lines are used more intensively 
during the first year and decline afterwards. If this is the case, we expect a smaller effect 
for defaulted credit lines, since their usage rates are higher. Thus, if β14 is estimated to be 
negative, the estimated β15 is expected to be positive, such that β14 + β15 <0. Finally, we retain 
the long termi and collateralizedi variables as before (at least in the OLS and Tobit estimates). 
The firm-specific variables based solely on the CIR database are introduced into 
the model as: 
2 jt 21 jt-1 22 jt-1
23 jt-1
24 jt-1
firm  ln(1+age as borrower ) firm risk
ln(1 # years with the bank )
ln(# bank relationships ).
β = β +β
+β +
+β
 (8) 
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The ln(1 + Age as borrowerjt-1) variable is the only proxy for age available within 
the CIR database and is constructed as the logged number of years since the first time 
a loan was granted to the firm. The expected sign on β21 is negative although this 
is only a control variable in this specification. The other variables are the same as before. 
Note that, as before, we highlight the Within-Groups parameter estimates. 
Table 5 reports the three sets of regression results for the merged dataset. Since the 
ex-post default indicator is a binary variable, it cannot be examined using the Within-Groups 
estimation. Focusing on the other estimation techniques, the coefficient on the ex-post 
default indicator variable is positive and significant with a semi-elasticity of about 38%, 
which implies that defaulted credit lines have a usage rate 38% higher than non-defaulted 
ones. Since the average usage rates for the defaulted and non-defaulted firms in the 
sample are 63% and 47%, the model’s 38% increase (47% * 1.38 = 65%) seems reasonable. 
This effect is clearly much stronger than the ex-ante case used in the Informa-SABI 
subsample. The two interacted years-to-default variables show a positive and very 
significant relationship, suggesting an increasing use of credit lines as a firm’s time 
to default approaches, as suggested in Figure 3. The semi-elasticity of these two terms 
in the third column is about 13%, which means that one year closer to default raises the 
usage rate 13% relative to the average usage rate. 
We also find that our line age variable is important here as well. The age effect 
captured by a linear trend has a negative and significant coefficient for all estimation 
techniques, which implies the usage rate decreases by about 10% per year with respect 
to the average usage rate. If we examine the interaction between line age and the 
Defaultedi indicator using the Tobit estimation results, we find that the age effect is weaker 
for defaulted credit lines at a 4.5% decrease (=-10.4% + 5.9%). The countervailing positive 
default effect and negative age effect suggest an interesting U-shaped pattern in credit 
line, as illustrated in Figure 3. Using the average values for all the other explanatory variables, 
Figure 3 shows the impact of the age effect for non-defaulting firms and the joint impact for 
defaulting firms. Starting at seven years prior to default and with a new line, usage rates 
are at 54.5% and 57.3%, respectively. As we approach default, the age effect linearly 
lowers the usage rate for non-defaulting firms to 6% by the default year. For defaulting firms, 
this linear decline is more gradual and is outweighed by the default effect starting at 45.3% 
four years prior to default to reach the 59.3% by default year. 
While these two effects are the main drivers of credit line usage, the maturity 
and collateral variables also have an impact, as shown in the second column of Table 5. 
The maturity indicator has an important impact, where longer maturity lines have usage 
rates that are 5.2% higher than one-year lines. Collateralized credit lines are found to have 
slightly higher usage rates than uncollateralized lines, as found in the subsample results. 
Turning to the limited firm-specific effects in the CIR dataset, the firm’s age as a 
borrower (i.e., how many years it has been in the CIR database) has a positive relationship 
with credit line usage. However, this result is not consistent across the three estimation 
methods and also differs from Informa-SABI results in Table 3. Probably age as borrower 
is far from being a perfect proxy for the age of the firm, the variable it tries to proxy. As before, 
the firm riskjt-1measure based on prior defaults is highly negatively correlated with credit line 
use, suggesting that lower-quality borrowers use their lines more carefully or are closely 
monitored by their lenders. This is consistent across the three models and with Table 3 
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results, underlining the importance of credit history in order to use the credit lines. The results 
for the remaining variables are similar to those of the subsample results. 
We observe a negative relationship between credit line usage and the main 
bank variable as well as with the length of banking relationship variables, but a positive 
relationship with the number of banking relationships. These results continue to suggest 
that possible hold-up situations may be present in the Spanish banking system. However, 
given the overall value provided to firms by banking relationships, it is challenging to achieve 
a clear empirical conclusion on this point. 
For lender characteristics, the results vary slightly from the subsample 
results. Here, bank share is negative, but the bank NPL ratio is not statistically significant. 
Thus, smaller banks allow for a higher use of credit lines, which means that they allow 
riskier borrowers to draw down their lines. As before, credit lines granted by savings banks 
and cooperatives have lower usage rates than commercial banks. 
Finally, our full sample results also imply a significant negative relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions and credit line use, reinforcing the liquidity insurance role they 
seem to play for firms, including the smaller ones. 
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4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine corporate credit line usage within the Spanish economy. The 
analysis is based on the Spanish Credit Register, a huge transaction-based database 
known as the Central de Información de Riesgos (CIR), which covers all Spanish bank lending 
over the last twenty years, as well as the Informa-SABI database containing firm-level balance 
sheet data. The extensive nature of both datasets allows us to examine the determinants of 
corporate credit line usage as a function of loan-specific, firm-specific, and lender-specific 
factors as well as general macroeconomic conditions. 
One of our main findings is that credit lines are drawn down more by firms that 
eventually default on these lines than firms that do not. This usage rate is higher in a 
statistically significant way from at least three years prior to default and increases 
monotonically as default approaches. As far as we know, this empirical finding is new to the 
literature and has important implications for credit risk modeling and management in 
that exposure at default (EAD) in corporate credit lines cannot be considered independent 
of firm default probability. Moreover, given the option characteristics of credit lines, our results 
provide stylized facts that any pricing model must account for. 
From a multivariate perspective, our analysis suggests that a wide variety of 
loan-level, firm-level, lender-level and macroeconomic factors determine corporate credit line 
usage. We find that credit line default status, both ex-ante in the form of an expected default 
probability an ex-post as a default indicator variable, has a strong positive relationship with 
credit line usage. We also find that line age has a strong negative relationship with line usage. 
Borrowers identified ex-ante as riskier (i.e., those that have defaulted before) access their 
credit lines less, a result that is analogous to the firm profitability result found by Sufi (2008) 
and is perhaps due to tighter bank monitoring. 
For a subsample of credit lines for which firm-level accounting data is available, 
we find that smaller and less profitable firms use their credit lines more intensively. We also 
find that credit line use is inversely related to the business cycle as proxied for by real 
GDP growth. Thus, credit lines seem to work as a liquidity insurance mechanism for firms, 
as discussed by Gatev and Strahan (2005) and Sufi (2008). 
 Our results provide large-sample evidence on the determinants of corporate credit 
line use that reinforces a number of related findings in the literature. In addition, our results 
have direct implications for modeling exposure at default (EAD), a key element of credit loss 
and loan pricing calculations. While we find EAD to be a random variable, most credit risk 
models currently treat EAD as known. Even more surprisingly, EAD is commonly assumed to 
be independent of a firm’s default probability (commonly known as PD). Our analysis indicates 
that PD and EAD are closely related and that this correlation must be accounted for to 
generate accurate credit risk measures. Our empirical results advance the understanding 
of the determinants of EAD and provide some of the necessary foundations for future work on 
that subject. 
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Table 1. 
 
Mean and median values of usage rate for the full CIR sample of defaulted credit lines
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
from default # obs. Median Mean
-5 85 50.0 52.1
-4 228 50.0 50.3
-3 717 58.3 56.2
-2 1,939 62.1 60.4
-1 4,512 66.7 64.2
0 4,512 71.1 64.7
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Table 2. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the Informa-SABI sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ijktRDRAWN  is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) when the credit lines was granted of a 
credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable iline credit Defaulted  takes one if the credit line defaults anytime during its life and zero 
otherwise. The variable itloan the of Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was grated; iterm Long  is a dummy variable 
worth 1 if the maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise iizedCollateral  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the credit line 
is collateralized and 0 otherwise; )assets Ln(Total 1-jt  proxies for the size of the firm; 1-jtfirm the of geA is the number of years since the 
firm was set up; profitability is measured by 1-jtROA , the ratio between EBIT and total assets; 1-jtassets alEquity/Tot  measures the 
solvency of the firm; 1-jtrisk Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j and takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaulted any time 
until t; 1-jtbank the  withyears of No. measures the number of years since the firm got the first loan with the bank; 
1-jtipsrelationsh bank of No. is the number of banks with which the firm has loans;. The variable PDit is a generated, one-year default 
probability for the credit line. iktbank Main  is a dummy variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank for the firm 
and 0 otherwise; kt shareBank  proxies the size of the bank through its market share in loans to firms; ktratio NPL Bank  is the non-
performing loan ratio of bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the year; kbank  Savings  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is 
a savings bank, 0 otherwise; kecooperativ Credit  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit cooperative, 0 otherwise; and 
1+tGDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at t+1.  
No. of observatios: 425,939
No.of  credit lines: 183,723
No.of firms: 85,949
Sample period: 1993-2005
Mean S.D. Min Q25 Median Q75 Max
Credit Line Characteristics
  RDRAWNijkt (%) 44.91 33.34 0.00 13.33 44.44 74.49 100.00
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 0.001 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  Life of the loanit 1.36 1.56 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 18.00
  Long termi (0/1) 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  Collateralizedi (0/1) 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Firm Characteristics
  Total assetsjt-1 (thousand of euros) 2,723.78 2,851.08 43.68 498.15 1,345.20 4,446.00 7,900.09
  Age of the firmjt-1 11.25 7.65 1.00 5.00 10.00 16.00 26.00
  ROAjt-1 (%) 7.23 7.95 -37.68 3.08 6.10 10.31 60.55
  Equity/Total assetsit-1 (%) 27.03 19.12 0.01 12.14 23.09 37.95 100.00
  Firm riskjt-1 (0/1) 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. of years with the bankjt-1 5.09 4.29 0.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 21.00
  No. of bank relationshipsjt-1 3.48 2.93 0.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 9.00
  PD (%) 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 5.12
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt (0/1) 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
  Bank sharekt (%) 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 14.72
  Bank NPL ratiokt (%) 0.00 0.57 -9.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 98.70
  Savings bankk (0/1) 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 (%) 3.53 0.72 2.38 3.00 3.43 3.86 5.04
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Table 3. 
 
Estimation of the baseline model for the Informa-SABI sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear model: 
itijktktjtitijkt εηCycleEconomicβBankβFirmβLineCreditββRDRAWN ++++++= 43210 . 
Tobit model: 
)0),100,(( 431210 itijktktjtitijkt εηCycleEconomicβBankβFirmβLineCreditββMinMaxRDRAWN ++++++= − . 
The dependant variable ( ijktRDRAWN ) is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) when the credit 
lines i was granted to firm j by bank k. The variable PDit is a generated, one-year default probability for the credit line. The variable 
itloan the of Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was grated; iterm Long  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of 
the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise iizedCollateral  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the credit line is collateralized and 0 
otherwise; )assets Ln(Total 1-jt  proxies for the size of the firm; 1-jtfirm the of geA is the number of years since the firm was set up; 
profitability is measured by 1-jtROA , the ratio between EBIT and total assets; 1-jtassets alEquity/Tot  measures the solvency of the firm; 
1-jtrisk Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j and takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaulted any time until t; 
1-jtbank the  withyears of No. measures the number of years since the firm got the first loan with the bank; 1-jtipsrelationsh bank of No. is 
the number of banks with which the firm has loans; iktbank Main  is a dummy variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the 
main bank for the firm and 0 otherwise; kt shareBank  proxies the size of the bank through its market share in loans to 
firms; ktratio NPL Bank  is the non-performing loan ratio of bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the year; kbank  Savings  is a 
dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a savings bank, 0 otherwise; kecooperativ Credit  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit 
cooperative, 0 otherwise; and 1+tGDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at t+1. ijkη  is an unobservable credit line effect 
fixed over time; and itε  is an error term. T-ratios are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Test for serial correlation are based 
on estimates of the residuals in first differences except where the model has been estimated in levels. ***, **, *: statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Semi-elasticity is computed as the marginal effect divided by the sample mean of the usage 
rate. 
Estimation Method
No. of observatios: 425,939 No. of observatios: 264.272
No. of  credit lines: 183,723 No. of credit lines: 130.141
No. of firms: 85,949 No. of firms: 72.701
Sample period: 1993-2005 Sample period: 1993-2005
Dependant variable: RDRAWNijkt Dependant variable: RDRAWNijkt
CONSTANT COMMITMENT
Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity
2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Credit Line Characteristics
      Default effect
  Prob(Defaultit=1)ijt-1 3.516 *** 7.8 4.970 *** 9.0 3.334 ** 7.4 5.099 ** 11.4
      Age effect
  Life of the loanit -4.597 *** -10.2 -6.475 *** -11.7 -4.526 *** -10.1 -3.219 *** -7.2
      Other effects
  Long termi (0/1) 3.073 *** 6.8 3.503 *** 6.3 --  -- --  --
  Collateralizedi (0/1) 0.425 * 0.9 2.539 *** 4.6 --  -- --  --
Firm Characteristics
  Ln(Total assetsjt-1) -0.897 *** -2.0 -1.027 *** -1.9 -0.980 * -2.2 -0.496  -1.1
  Ln(1+Age of the firmjt-1) -0.144  -0.3 -0.286 ** -0.5 -0.696  -1.6 1.438  3.2
  ROAjt-1 -0.197 *** -0.4 -0.183 *** -0.3 -0.042 *** -0.1 -0.041 *** -0.1
  Equity/Total assetsjt-1 -0.138 *** -0.3 -0.156 *** -0.3 -0.016  0.0 -0.049 ** -0.1
  Firm riskjt-1 -2.801 *** -6.2 -3.525 *** -6.4 -5.520 *** -12.3 -2.131  -4.7
  Ln(1+No. of years with the bankjt-1) -2.517 *** -5.6 -2.582 *** -4.7 -1.593 *** -3.5 0.814  1.8
  Ln(No. of bank relationshipsjt-1) 4.940 *** 11.0 5.049 *** 9.1 0.579 ** 1.3 1.330 *** 3.0
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt 2.290 *** 5.1 1.034 *** 1.9 -2.639 *** -5.9 -1.825 *** -4.1
  Bank sharekt -1.730 ** -3.9 -3.367 *** -6.1 -0.694  -1.5 0.041  0.1
  Bank NPL ratiokt 0.150 * 0.3 0.152  0.3 0.148 ** 0.3 0.270 *** 0.6
  Savings bankk (0/1) -3.300 *** -7.3 -3.742 *** -6.8 --  -- --  --
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) -1.957 *** -4.4 -2.190 *** -4.0 --  -- --  --
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 0.306 *** 0.7 0.284 *** 0.5 -0.389 *** -0.9 -0.860 *** -1.9
  Constant 65.016 *** -- 67.995 *** -- 64.535 *** -- 56.207 *** --
Industry dummies (9) Yes Yes No No
Regional dummies (16) Yes Yes No No
Credit Line/Firm/Bank fixed effect (ηijk) No No Yes Yes
F-test   (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1rst order serial correlation 0.60 0.62 -0.44 -0.46
2nd order serial correlation 0.52 0.55 0.01 0.02
OLS
Model 1
Within-Groups
Model 3
Within-Groups
Model 4Model 2
Tobit with Random effects
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Table 4. 
Descriptive statistics for the model. CIR sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ijktRDRAWN  is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) when the credit lines was granted of 
a credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable iline credit Defaulted  takes one if the credit line defaults anytime during its life and 
zero otherwise; itdefault from years No.  measures the time to default in years for those credit lines that do default during its 
life; itloan the of Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was grated; iterm Long  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the 
maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise iizedCollateral  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the credit line is 
collateralized and 0 otherwise ; 1-jtfirm the of Age  is the number of years from the first time the firm borrowed from a bank; 
1-jtrisk Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j and takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaulted any time until t; 
1-jtbank the  withyears of No. measures the number of years since the firm got the first loan with the bank; 
1-jtipsrelationsh bank of No.  is the number of banks with which the firm has loans; iktbank Main is a dummy variable that takes one 
if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank for the firm and 0 otherwise; kt shareBank  proxies the size of the bank through its 
market share in loans to firms; ktratio NPL Bank  is the non-performing loan ratio of bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of 
the year; kbank  Savings  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a savings bank, 0 otherwise; kecooperativ Credit  is a dummy 
variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit cooperative, 0 otherwise.; and 1+tGDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at 
t+1. 
No. of observatios: 2,078,434
No.of  credit lines: 770,371
No.of firms: 368,977
Sample period: 1986-2005
Mean S.D. Min Q25 Median Q75 Max
Credit Line Characteristics
  RDRAWNijkt (%) 47.53 32.97 0.00 19.05 50.00 76.11 100.00
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. years from defaultit (for defaulted credit lines) -1.01 1.09 -11.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00
  Life of the loanit 1.17 1.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 20.00
  Long termi (0/1) 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  Collateralizedi (0/1) 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Firm Characteristics
  Age as borrowerjt-1 6.78 5.23 0.00 3.00 6.00 10.00 21.00
  Firm riskjt-1 (0/1) 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
  No. of years with the bankjt-1 3.87 3.82 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 21.00
  No. of bank relationshipsjt-1 2.82 2.90 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 9.00
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt (0/1) 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
  Bank sharekt (%) 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 14.72
  Bank NPL ratiokt (%) 0.00 0.81 -11.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.58
  Savings bankk (0/1) 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 (%) 3.36 1.22 -1.03 2.76 3.33 3.86 5.55
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Linear model: 
itijktktjtitijkt εηCycleEconomicβBankβFirmβLineCreditββRDRAWN ++++++= 43210 . 
Tobit model: 
)0),100,(( 431210 itijktktjtitijkt εηCycleEconomicβBankβFirmβLineCreditββMinMaxRDRAWN ++++++= −
The dependant variable ( ijktRDRAWN ) is the ratio of the amount drawn at t to the amount available (drawn plus undrawn) 
when the credit lines was granted of a credit line i to firm j by bank k. The variable iline credit Defaulted  takes one if the 
credit line defaults anytime during its life and zero otherwise; itdefault from years No.  measures the time to default in years 
for those credit lines that do default during its life; itloan the of Life  measures the number of years since the credit line was 
grated; iterm Long  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the maturity of the credit lines is longer that 1 year and 0 otherwise 
iizedCollateral  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the credit line is collateralized and 0 otherwise ; 1-jtfirm the of Age  is the 
number of years from the first time the firm borrowed from a bank; 1-jtrisk Firm  controls for the observed risk of the firm j 
and takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaulted any time until t; 1-jtbank the  withyears of No. measures the number of 
years since the firm got the first loan with the bank; 1-jtipsrelationsh bank of No.  is the number of banks with which the firm 
has loans; iktbank Main is a dummy variable that takes one if the bank that granted the loan is the main bank for the firm and 
0 otherwise; kt shareBank  proxies the size of the bank through its market share in loans to firms; ktratio NPL Bank  is the 
non-performing loan ratio of bank k at time t with respect to the NPL ratio of the year; kbank  Savings  is a dummy variable 
worth 1 if the bank is a savings bank, 0 otherwise; kecooperativ Credit  is a dummy variable worth 1 if the bank is a credit 
cooperative, 0 otherwise.; and 1+tGDPG is the GDP rate of growth of the Spanish economy at t+1; ijkη  is an unobservable 
credit line effect fixed over time; and itε  is an error term. T-ratios are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Test 
for serial correlation are based on estimates of the residuals in first differences except where the model has been estimated in 
levels. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The Semi-elasticity is computed as the 
marginal effect divided by the sample mean of the usage 
 
Table 5. 
 
Estimation of the baseline model for the CIR sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimation Method
No. of observatios: 2,078,434
No.of  credit lines: 770,371
No.of firms: 368,977
Sample period: 1986-2005
Dependant variable RDRAWNijkt
Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity Coefficient
Semi-
elasticity
2.000 2.000 2.000
Credit Line Characteristics
      Default effect
  Defaulted credit linei (0/1) 17.534 *** 36.9 23.103 *** 39.8 -- --
  No. years from defaultit 6.698 *** 10.433 *** 6.028 ***
  No. years from default2it 0.657 *** 1.077 *** 0.285 **
      Age effect
  Life of the loanit -4.657 *** -9.8 -6.056 *** -10.4 -5.214 *** -11.0
  Life of the loanit*Defaulted credit linei 0.977 * 2.1 3.446 *** 5.9 -- --
      Other effects
  Long termi (0/1) 2.567 *** 5.4 3.032 *** 5.2 -- --
  Collateralizedi (0/1) -0.018  0.0 1.117 *** 1.9 -- --
Firm Characteristics
  Ln(1+Age as borrowerjt-1) -1.506 *** -3.2 -1.774 *** -3.1 4.494 *** 9.5
  Firm riskjt-1 -3.719 *** -7.8 -4.650 *** -8.0 -5.865 *** -12.3
  Ln(1+No. of years with the bankjt-1) -2.787 *** -5.9 -2.755 *** -4.7 -0.932 *** -2.0
  Ln(No. of bank relationshipsjt-1) 3.723 *** 7.8 3.941 *** 6.8 0.707 *** 1.5
Bank Characteristics
  Main bankikt 3.202 *** 6.7 2.749 *** 4.7 -1.094 *** -2.3
  Bank sharekt -3.747 *** -7.9 -4.194 *** -7.2 -1.026 ** -2.2
  Bank NPL ratiokt 0.016  0.0 0.025  0.0 0.026  0.1
  Savings bankk (0/1) -3.748 *** -7.9 -4.239 *** -7.3 -- --
  Credit cooperativek (0/1) -1.850 *** -3.9 -1.942 *** -3.3 -- --
Cycle Characteristics
  GDPGt+1 -0.958 *** -2.0 -1.014 *** -1.7 -0.498 *** -1.0
  Constant 63.635 *** -- 64.904 *** -- 48.356 *** 101.7
Industry dummies (9) Yes Yes No
Regional dummies (16) Yes Yes No
Credit Line/Firm/Bank fixed effect (ηijk) No No Yes
F-test   (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
1rst order serial correlatoin 0.64 0.65 -0.43
2nd order serial correlatoin 0.57 0.59 0.06
Tobit with Random effects
Model 2
12.7
Model 3
Within-Groups
14.1
OLS levels
Model 1
17.9
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 Figure 1. 
 
Histogram for the full CIR sample of credit line usage rates (RDRAWNijkt) 
 
 
The histogram presents the 2,078,434 credit line observations in our full sample. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Usage ratio for the full CIR sample of credit lines 
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 Figure 3. 
 
The behavior of the usage ratio of credit lines in the CIR sample  
distinguishing between defaulting and non-defaulting ones 
(Results based on Tobit parameter estimates) 
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